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THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF
POSTMODERNISM: A REJOINDER
Huston Smith
Accepting Lyotard's "incredulity toward metanarratives" as its definition of
postmodernism, and Derrida's "openness to the other" as deconstruction's
contribution to it this essay distinguishes three species of postmodernism:
minimal (we have no believable metanarratives), mainline (they are unavailable
in principle), and polemical ("good riddance!"). It then argues that the religious
impulse challenges all three of these contentions. Contra polemical postmodernism, metanarratives/worldviews are needed. Contra mainline postmodernism, reliable ones are possible. And contra minimal postmodernism, they
already exist - in the world's great, enduring religious traditions.

My decision to submit this essay was prompted by the recent issue of this
journal on "The Religious Significance of Contemporary Continental
Philosophy" (FP, Vol. 10, No.4, October 1993) which neglected the downside of that significance. The essay originated as an address titled
"Postmodernism and the World's Religions" that was delivered at the
International Institute for Islamic Thought and Civilization's inaugural
symposium on "Islam and the Challenge of Modernity," Kuala Lumpur,
August 1994. In that form it appears - reprinted from the proceedings of
that symposium - in Walter Truett Anderson (ed.), The Truth about Truth
(Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1995). Here I have omitted the references
to Islam that were specific to its original occasion. I have also aligned it
closer to the interests of this journal, and given it a new title .
•••

In the wake of its traditional and modern periods, the Western world is
now generally regarded as having become postmodern. And as the entire
world is still (at this stage) westernizing, I propose in this essay to think
about postmodernism's bearing, not exclusively on the religions of the
West but on religion generally. From the innumerable ways in which the
word postmodern has been and is being used, I select the one that I think
says most. It will occupy me exclusively.

Postmodernism as the Collapse of Inclusive Outlooks
Contrasts tend to throw things into relief, so I shall define the postmodernism I shall be working with by contrasting it with the traditional and
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modern outlooks that preceded it, using epistemology as my point of access.
Even today, when traditional peoples want to know where they are when they wonder about the ultimate context of their lives and what holds
final sway over their destinies - they turn to their sacred texts; or in the
case of oral, tribal peoples to the sacred myths that have been handed
down to them by their ancestors. Modernity was born when a new source
of knowledge was discovered, the scientific method. Because its controlled
experiment enabled scientists to prove their hypotheses, and because those
proven hypotheses had the power to change the material world dramatically, Westerners turned from revelation to science for the Big Picture.
Intellectual historians tell us that by the 19th century Westerners were
already more certain that atoms exist than they were confident of any of
the distinctive things the Bible speaks of.
This much is straightforward, but it doesn't explain why Westerners
aren't still modern rather than postmodern, for science continues to be the
main support of the Western mind. By headcount, most Westerners probably are still modern, but I am thinking of frontier thinkers who chart the
course for decades to come. Those thinkers have ceased to be modern
because they have seen through the so-called scientific worldview, recognizing it to be not scientific but scientistic. They continue to honor science
for what it tells us about nature, but as that is not all there is, science cannot
provide us with a worldview - not a valid one. The most it can show us
is half of the world, the half where normative and intrinsic values, existential and ultimate meanings, teleologies, qualities, immaterial realities, and
beings that are superior to us do not appear. 1
Where, then, do we now turn for an inclusive world view?
Postmodernism hasn't a clue. And this is its deepest definition. A decade
ago Jean-FranGois Lyotard targeted "incredulity toward metanarratives" as
the essence of The Postmodern Condition, and his definition has proved
durable.' Having deserted revelation for science, the West has now abandoned the scientific worldview as well, leaving it without replacement. In
this it mirrors the current stage of Western science which leaves nature
unimaged. Before modern science, westerners accepted Aristotle's model
of the earth as surrounded by concentric, crystalline spheres. Newton
replaced that model with his image of a clockwork universe, but postmodern, quantum-and-relativity science gives us not a third model of nature
but no model at all. Nature has become counter-intuitive. Alan Wallace's
Choosing Reality delineates eight different interpretations of quantum
physics, all of which can claim the support of physics' proven facts.3
An analogy can pull all this together. If we think of traditional peoples
as looking out upon the world through the window of revelation (their
received myths and sacred texts), the window people turned to in the
modern period (science) turns out to be stunted. It cuts off at the level of
the human nose, which (epistemologically speaking) means that when we
look through science's window our gaze slants downward and we see only
things that are inferior to us: As for the postmodern window, it is boarded
over and allows no inclusive view whatsoever. A recent issue of The
University of Chicago Magazine featured on its cover a photograph of
Richard Rorty announcing that "There is no Big Pichlre."
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This conclusion admits of three versions that grow increasingly shrill.
Minimal, descriptive postmodernism rests its case with the fact that today
no accepted worldview exists. Mainline, doctrinal postmodernism goes on
to argue for the permanence of this condition.' Never again will we have a
worldview of which we can be confident - we know too well how little the
human mind can know. Members of this camp disagree as to whether reality has a deep structure to be known, but they agree that if it has, the human
mind is incapable of knowing it. Hardcore, polemical postmodernism goes a
step further by adding, "Good riddance!" Worldviews oppress. They totalize, and in doing so marginalize minorities. Terry Eagleton goes so far as to
charge them with exercising "a secretly terroristic function.""
These three postmodern stances set the agenda for the rest of my paper,
for I want to argue that the world's religions question the last hvo, and qualify importantly the first? Negatively, they deny that inclusive views preponderantly oppress. Positively, they affirm that the human mind is made for
such views, and that reliable ones already exist. Before I enter upon these
constructive points, however, I want to take a quick look at recent French
philosophy. For though it was mostly the unbridled historicism of German
philosophers - Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger - that paved the way for
postmodernism, as our century closes it is the French who have taken the
lead. There is time to mention only one of them, and Jacques Derrida is the
obvious candidate for being postmodernism's most redoubtable spokesman.
His deconstruction is said already to be a mummy in Europe, but in America
no one has succeeded in toppling it from its pedestal where it continues to
preside, more or less, over the postmodern scene.

The French Connection: Dcrrida and Deconstruction
Richard Rorty is a shining exception, but postmodernists in general are
not given to plain and simple language and deconstructionists read like
caricatures of that assertion. Derrida calls "stupid" the view that deconstruction "amounts to saying that there is nothing beyond language,"S but
whose fault is this when he ensconces "il n'y a pas de hors-texte" (there is
nothing outside the text) as the virtual motto for his movement. 9 Even
sympathetic interpreters have trouble explaining that slogan. John
Caputo assures us that Derrida does not "trap us inside the 'chain of signifiers,' in linguistic-subjective idealism, unable to do anything but play
vainly with linguistic strings"; but a page or two later he reverts to the
original shibboleth: "there are no things themselves outside textual and
contextual limits .... " The balance of his sentence doesn't qualify that
assertion; it shifts to a different issue, the issue of "presence" as he continues, "[there is] no naked contact with being which somehow shakes loose
of the coded system which makes notions like the 'things in themselves'
possible to begin with and which enables speakers to refer to them."'(1
Small wonder satirists have a field day. "Deconstruction goes well
beyond right-you-are-if-you-think-you-are," Walt Anderson reports. "Its
message is closer to wrong you are whatever you think, unless you think
you're wrong, in which case you may be right - but you don't really
mean what you think you do anyway."l1
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I mention this because the costiveness of Derrida's prose makes one
wonder whether it serves, if not to camouflage a leaky theory, then to
make it pretentious - where there is so much obscurity, can profundity be
far behind?12 Schroedinger told us that if you cannot in the end tell everybody what you are doing your work has been in vain. Let's see how
deconstruction measures up to that test.
Derrida insists that contrary to its public image, deconstruction is an
affirmative project,13 for at heart it is "openness to the other."14 One immediately wonders why (if the project is open and affirmative) Derrida faults
negative theology for "still making a positive point'?' It looks like he is
open to "others" that he agrees with and not the rest, but let that pass.
John Caputo (whose exposition of Derrida I am relying on primarily in this
essay) glosses deconstructive openness as follows:
Oerrida's thought is through and through a philosophy of "alterity," ... a relentless attentiveness and sensitivity to the 'other.' [It]
stands for a kind of hyper-sensitivity to many "others"; the other
person, other species, "man's" other, the other of the West, of
Europe, of Being, of the "classic," of philosophy, of reason, etc.
(The list goes on.)16
Putting this foot forward makes deconstruction attractive, immensely
so, for if God is included among "others," deconstruction (by this reading)
looks a lot like religion; surely religion's object is to deliver us from narcissistic self-centeredness into the otherness of God and (through God) other
people. 17 Deconstructionist prose swells with virtue, which is not surprising, given that it uses virtues - openness, and alternatively justice;
Oerrida: "deconstruction is justice"18 - for its self-definitions. This makes
things awkward for its critics, for their criticisms put them in the position
of seeming to be against things that everybody wants; but the question is
whether deconstruction's hermeneutical awe of the Other does more than
preach the empathy we all aspire to? Do its claimed "skills" help us develop and deploy that virtue? Are its practitioners more open to positions
they disagree with than are other theorists? Its theological enthusiasts see
in it "a rich and vigorous catalyst for religious thought [for being] an open
ended call to let something new come; ... an approach that lets faith function
with an enhanced sense of advent, gladdened by the good news of alterity
by which we are summoned."19 But this sounds like using Christian connotations of Advent to bless modern enthusiasms for quantity, novelty,
and progress - the more new arrivals the better. What if the newly welcomed guest turns out to be the Devil in disguise? Exactly how solicitous
are we supposed to be when the "others" are skinhead Neo-Nazis and the
Klu Klux Klan? Our hearts invariably go out to the downtrodden others
that deconstructionists name, but have they discovered techniques to help
us winnow hard cases? Obviously an infinite number of contrasts to, or
negations of, any particular given are conceivable. Which warrant our
attention, and which only distract us from our appointed course?
This is no small question, but the deeper point is this. Deconstruction is
above all a theory of language. This should temper our expectations right
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off, for those theories come and go - structuralism, poststructuralism, generative grammar; what will be next? Two things, though, remain stable in
the incessant parade. First, the deeper theorists dive into language, the bigger their problems become. A review of Randy Harris's recent book, The
Linguistic Wars, concludes by quoting a linguist as saying, "You know, language has got us licked. The score is language, one billion, linguists, zero."20
The second constant in the ongoing procession is that theories of language have little effect on the ideas that people use words to shape. 21
Caputo grants this, at least in part.
To the age old dispute between belief and unbelief, deconstruction
comes equipped with a kind of armed neutrality. [It] neither
includes nor excludes existence of any positive entity .... There is
nothing about deconstruction ... that affirms or falsifies the claims
of faith; nothing that confirms or denies the claims of physiological
reductionists who see there only the marvelous promptings not of
the Spirit, but of certain neurotransmitters.22
This claimed neutrality is deceptive, however, for in our materialistic
age, deconstruction's "heightened sense of suspicion about the constructedness of our discourse" (Caputo) works more against intangibles than
against neurotransmitters. Practically speaking, this places Derrida in the
camp of the massed powers of cognition that oppose the human spirit
today. When Saul Bellow tells us that
the value of literature lies in "true impressions." A novel moves
back and forth between the world of objects, of actions, of appearances, and that other world, from which these "true impressions"
come and which moves us to believe that the good we hang on to
so tenaciously - in the face of evil, so obstinately - is no illusion,23
- when (as I say) an artist expresses such views, religionists take him at
his word but Derrida will not. His "heightened sense of suspicion" will
not allow "presences" - his word for Bellow's "true impressions" - to be
accepted at face value. 24
Some things need to be deconstructed. Scientism needs all the deconstructing it can get, and the Buddha's deconstruction of the empirical ego
by showing it to be a composite of skandas that derive from pratitya-samutpada (co-dependent origination) is a marvel of psychological analysis. But
the Buddha tore down in order to rebuild; specifically to show that "utter
[phenomenal] groundlessness (nonbeing) is equivalent to full groundedness (being)."25 Likewise Pseudo-Dionysius. No one saw more clearly
than he that
the intelligence must interpret, correct, straighten out, "reduce,"
and deny the images, forms, and schemes in which are materially
represented the divine realities they are unable to contain. [But
this] radical critique and rejection by the intelligence of each of the
[Divine] names that are more or less accessible to it indicate defi-
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nite steps fonvard of this same intelligence in the direction of its own
divinization ."26

One looks in vain for anything approaching such exalted issues from
Derrida's dismantlings. They look like one more instance of our centurylong hermeneutics of suspicion, mounted this time linguistically.
I fear that in giving the space that I have to Derrida my wish to come
within hailing distance of at least one instance of postmodernism may have
drawn me too far into its circle, for hand to hand combat never avails against
these philosophers; their minds are too agile. So before proceeding to postmodernism's religious alternative, I shall drop my dirk, back off a distance,
and aim a javelin at the premises its philosophers work from. For in Yogi
Berra's aphorism, they make the wrong mistake. Misjudging what our times
require, they provide brilliant answers to the wrong question. To wit:
Already at the opening of this century Yeats was warning that things
were falling apart, that the center doesn't hold. Gertrude Stein followed
him by noting that "in the twentieth century nothing is in agreement with
anything else." Ezra Pound saw man as "hurling himself at indomitable
chaos," and the most durable line from the play Green Pastures has been,
"Everything that's tied down is coming loose." It is not surprising, therefore, that when in her last interview Rebecca West was asked to name the
dominant mood of our time, she replied, "A desperate search for a pattern."
The search is desperate because it seems futile to look for a pattern when
reality has become, in Roland Barth's vivid image, kaleidoscopic. With
every tick of the clock the pieces of experience come down in new array.
This is what we are up against; this is what postmodernity is: the balkanization of life and thought. Perpetual becoming is preying on us like a
deadly sickness, and (deaf to E. M. Forster's counsel, "only connect") postmoderns think that more disconnections, more dismantlings and differences (and the increased fragmentation, distractions, and dispersions these
produce) is what we need. If we could replay at fast speed a videotape of
our century's social and conceptual earthquakes, we would see the deconstructionists scurrying around like madmen in hardhats, frantically looking for places where a little more demolition and destabilization might
prove usefuJ.2 7

Religion's Response to Postmodernism: 1. Worldviews Are Needed
In turning now to postmodernism's religious alternative, I shall speak of
it in the singular and simply assume what I argued in Forgotten Truth;
namely, that a common metaphysical "spine" underlies the differences in
the theologies of the classical languages of the human soul, the world's
great religions. 28 Tackling in reverse order the three modes of postmodernism that I earlier delineated, I shall report as straightforwardly as I can
- there won't be much space to argue what I say - the religious claims
that people need world views, that reliable ones are possible, and that they
already exist.
As religions on their conceptual sides are worldviews or metanarratives
- inclusive posits concerning the ultimate nature of things - its custodians
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cannot accept polemical postmodernism's contention that on balance they
oppress. George Will has observed that "the magic word of modernity is
'society"'; and the present case bears him out, for it is primarily for their
social consequences that polemical postmoderns find worldviews harmfup9
In applying that yardstick they simply assume (they do not argue) that religion does more harm than good. That this runs counter to social science
functionalism, which holds that institulions don't survive unless they serve
social needs, is conveniently overlooked/o but the deeper point is that the
vertical dimension - the way religion feeds the human soul in its inwardness and solitariness - receives little attention. When the personal and private dimension of life (which intersects the vertical) is validated, it is not difficult to see the function that worldviews serve. Minds require eco-niches
as much as organisms do, and the mind's eco-niche is its worldview, its
sense of the whole of things, however much or little that sense is articulated.
Short of madness, there is some fit between the two, and we constantly try to
improve the fit. Signs of a poor fit are the sense of meaninglessness, alienation, and in acute cases anxiety, which postmodernity knows so well. The
proof of a good fit is that life and the world make sense. When the fit feels
perfect, the energies of the cosmos pour into the believer and empower her
to startling degree. She knows that she belongs, and this produces an inner
wholeness that is strong for being consonant with the wholeness of the AlP
The very notion of an All is a red flag to deconstructionists for seeming to
disallow alterity; and in a sense it does disallow it, for, being whole, God
cannot be exclusive. But as God's inclusiveness is unique in including all
the "otherness" there is - God's infinity is all-possibility - alterity is
allowed as much room as it can conceivably have.
One would think that postmodern theologians, at least, would honor
this sense of ultimate belonging that religion bestows. Heirs, though, to
modernity, they too have adopted "society" as their watchword, allowing
social considerations to upstage ontological ones. Both absolutism and relativism have bright and shadow sides. The virtue of the Absolute is the
power it offers the soul; its danger is the fanaticism into which that power
can slip. In the case of relativism, its virtue is tolerance, and nihilism is its
shadow side. Where social considerations predominate, it is the dark side
of absolutism (fanaticism) and the bright side of relativism (tolerance) that
are noticed, these being their social components. In both cases, the vertical
dimensions - which would reverse our estimates of the two - are underplayed if not ignored.

II. Worldviews Are Possible
In proceeding from the need for world views to their possibility, I have
in mind of course the possibility of valid world views, not castles in the air.
The religious claim that the human mind has access to such views challenges mainline postmodernism in the way its preceding claim - that
world views are needed - challenged its polemical version.
Mainline postmodernism takes its stand on human finitude, arguing
that as finite minds are no match for the infinite, there can be no fit
between the two. What gets overlooked in this disjunction is the subtleties
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that finitude admits of: its degrees, modes, and paradoxes. With its fana,
anatta, and maya, religion in its highest registers denies that finitude, as
such, fully exists. Postmodernism cannot comprehend that, any more than
it can comprehend the other side of the paradox: that finitude hosts the
imago dei, Atman, Buddha-nature, Uncreated Intellect, and Universal Man.
God alone exists, and everything that exists is God.
These are difficult concepts, so I reach for analogies. A wisp of spray is
not the ocean, but the two are identically water. Or if we imagine an infinite
lump of clay that tapers into tentacles and then into filaments that dwindle
toward nothingness, the final tips of those filaments are still clay. To the religious spirit, such thoughts can serve as powerful springboards in suggesting
our connectedness to God. Which connectedness - this is the immediate
point - has epistemic implications. Postmoderns burlesque those who
protest the cramped, postmodern view of the mind, charging them with
claiming that humans can soar to a God's-eye view of things - as if omniscience were the only alternative to Kant's categories. Worldviews are
human views, which means that they conform to human modes of thought
in the way a bird's-eye view of the world honors its modes. But Blake's dictum is decisive here: "I see through my eyes, not with them." That the
world, taken as the whole of things, looks different to God and other species
than it does to us does not prevent there being better and worse, right and
wrong ways that human beings take it to be. In a subordinate sense, the
right way includes many right ways - as many as appropriately different
ways of being human decree. Differe:t;lces in the world's great theologies
provide an impressive instance of this, but here the point is that mistakes are
possible and do occur, postmodernism being one of them.
To be valid, an overview need not be complete. A photograph of the
Himalayas can accurately portray their contours without including every
crevasse, and it is only the contours of reality - more specifically, those
that we need to discern in order to live wisely - that metanarratives seek
to portray.
The features of postmodern epistemology that most challenge their project are two: perspectivalism carried to the point of absurdity, and a stunted reading of Kant.
Perspectivalism becomes absurd when the obvious fact that we look at
the world from different places, hence different angles, is transformed into
the dogma that we therefore cannot know things as they actually are. For
Kant, it was our human angle (the categories of the mind) that prevents us
from knowing things in themselves; and when psychological, cultural,
temporal, and linguistic filters are added to this generic one, we get constructivism, cultural relativism, historicism, and cultural-linguistic holism
respectively. What dogmatic perspectivalism in all these modes overlooks
is that to recognize that perspectives are such requires knowing in some
way and to some extent the wholes that demote them to that status.
Without such knowledge, each "take" (as they say in movie making)
would be accepted as the thing itself. Visually, we need only move around
the room to get a sense of the whole that shows our perspectives to be no
more than that; but the mind is a dexterous instrument and can put itself
"in other peoples' shoes," as we say.32 When the shoes belong to strangers,
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we transcend cultural relativism; when they are removed in time we transcend all-or-nothing historicism. When this is pointed out to postmoderns
they again burlesque, charging their informants with claiming to be able to
climb out of their skins, or (in the case of time) hop a helicopter for past
epochs. Both images are self-serving by pointing their spatial referents in
the wrong direction. The alternative to perspectivalism is not to get out of
oneself but to delve into oneself until one reaches things that are timeless
and elude space altogether. Postmodernism isn't interested in delving,
however. To the question Jonathan Rabin poses for postmodern urban
dwellers in Soft City - how can they get beneath surfaces to identify essential meanings? - David Harvey responds: "Postmodernism, with its resignation to bottomless fragmentation and ephemerality, generally refuses to
contemplate that question." 33
As for stunted Kantianism, it omits Kant's notion of ideas, of which
there are three: I, God, and the world. 34 Ideas differ from concepts in having no ostensive, denotatable referents, but this precludes neither (a) their
having referents that elude the senses, nor (b) our getting somewhere in
thinking about them. In the case of world in its inclusive meaning - the
concern of metanarratives - "getting somewhere" means using kataphatic
language as fingers to point to the moon which stands for the supraformal
Ultimate: call it Godhead, sunyata, Nirguna Brahman, the unspeakable Tao,
whatever. If postmoderns know things about the ineffability of this
Ultimate that escaped apophatic metaphysicians like Dionysius, Shankara,
and Nagarjuna, that is too important a discovery to remain an in-house
secret; they owe it to the rest of us to tell us plainly what it is. If, on the
other hand, their critiques apply only to theologies that stop at the
katophatic level, two points must be made. First, the critiques are redundant in being aimed at targets that all the classical traditions in their fullness have relativized. Second, they fall short of the wisdom of those traditions in not giving the kataphatic its due - Heidegger, Wittgenstein and
Derrida all fall under this charge. Without established first order religious
discourse, the complex set of theological variations that constitute negative
theology are impossible. The ascent of the spiritual intellect that apophatic
theology is designed to launch cannot begin without a fairly well-grounded conception of the divine, for without that there is nothing to invite the
religious imagination to exceed and surpass. An established kataphatic
theology is the prerequisite of apophasis.
To return for a moment to the photograph of the Himalayas: From the
traditional apophatic vantage point, world views are not so much replicas
of, as guides to, the Ultimate. As such they can be true in the way a compass can point to true north without - what would postmoderns have the
compass do? Describe north? But postmoderns won't let us say such
things, having put truth itself "on warning," or "called it into question."35
(Ah, those arch, precious, supercilious, "in" locutions.) Wittgenstein prefigured the entire shift from modernity to postmodernity when he characterized his turn from his early to his late period as a shift from truth to
meaning. Here again the postmodern preoccupation with the social
obtrudes, for the fanatical impulse to cram truth down other persons'
throats leads postmoderns to back off from the notion generally, especially

Faith and Philosophy

418

if Truth is capitalized. In doing so they overlook the fact that truth is fallibilism's prerequisite, not its alternative. Where there is no via (way, truth)
to deviate from, mistakes have no meaning. 36

III. Valid Worldviews Exist
Working my way backwards through postmodernism's three versions, I
come lastly to its minimal claim which simply reports that we have no
believable world views today. "We have no maps, and we don't know
how to make them," is the way one of the authors of The Good Society puts
the point. 37
Whereas the two stronger versions of postmodernism needed to be challenged for interfering with the human spirit, this minimalist position, being
at root a description, poses no real problem. The description can, though,
be qualified somewhat. In saying that we have no maps, the "we" in the
minimalist's assertion refers to Western intellectuals. Peoples whose
minds have not been reshaped by modernity and its sequel continue to live
by the maps of their revelations.
We saw that polemical postmoderns (prone to assume that maps must
be believed fanatically if they are believed at all) charge revelations with
fomenting disharmony. Fundamentalism is their prime target; what they
do not see is the extent to which they, as postmoderns, have engendered it.
For political conservativism is not fundamentalism's deepest telos. Its
deepest concern, which conservative politicians use to their advantage, is
the threat of relativism and nihilism that postmodernism harbors. Here
again the liberals' prioritizing of social consequences over religion's
inward deliverances skews their perception of things.
If mainline and polemical postmodernism were to recede, the obsession
with life's social fabric that they saddle us with would relax and we would
find ourselves able to think ontologically again. An important consequence of this would be that we would then see how much religious outlooks have in common. For one thing, they all situate the manifest, visible
world within a whole that is largely invisible. Current cosmology provides
a nice analogy for this, for dark matter doesn't impact any of science's
detectors, and the current recipe for the universe is, "70 parts cold dark
matter, about 30 parts hot dark matter, and just a pinch for all the rest the matter detectable to scientific instruments."J8 The further unanimous
claim of religious cosmologies, though, finds no echo in science, for (being
a value judgment) it is beyond science's reach. Not only is the invisible
real. Regions of it are more real and of greater worth than is the visible
world that echoes them.
The inclusive, presiding paradigm for traditional cosmologies is a loose
version of the Great Chain of Being, composed of links ranging in hierarchical order from meager existents up to the ens perfectissimum; and the
foremost student of that concept, Arthur Lovejoy, reported that "most educated persons everywhere accepted [it] without question down to late in
the eighteenth century" when scientism unhorsed it. 39 To that endorsement, Ken Wilber has recently added that the Great Chain of Being is "so
overwhelmingly widespread ... that it is either the single greatest intellectual
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error ever to appear in humankind's history - an error so colossally widespread as to literally stagger the mind - or it is the single most accurate
reflection of reality yet to appear."""

Conclusion
To propose that religions cash in the kataphatic, theological regions of
their metanarratives for metaphysical similarities that they share would be
as absurd as to urge people to peel off their flesh so the similarities of their
skeletons could jump to light. But if the warfare between science and religion, and now postmodernism and religion, could wind down, religions
might find themselves co-existing relatively happily within a minimally
articulated meta narrative for the faith that infuses them all, much as the
eight current models of the quantum world share the context of what
quantum physicists in general agree on. Or in the way in which (in the
modern period) competing scientific theories shared the metanarrative of
the scientific worldview.
Were this to happen, the atmosphere would be more salubrious, for I
know no one who thinks that the postmodern view of the self and its
makeshift world are nobler than the ones that the world's religions offer.
Postmoderns acquiesce to their rundown views, not because they like
them, but because they think that reason and human historicity now force
them upon us.
It has been the burden of my remarks that this is not the case.

Syracuse University
NOTES
1. This important point is not generally recognized, so I shall spell it out.
The death-knell to modernity, which had science as its source and hope, was
sounded with the realization that despite its power in limited regions, six
things slip through its controlled experiments in the way sea slips through the
nets of fishermen:
a. Values. Science can deal with descriptive and instrumental values,
but not with intrinsic and normative ones.
b. Meanings. Science can work with cognitive meanings, but not with
existential meanings (is X meaningful?), or ultimate ones (what is the
meaning of life?).
c. Purposes. Science can handle teleonomy - purposiveness in organisms - but not teleology, final causes.
d. Qualities. Quantities science is good at, but not qualities.
e. The invisible and immaterial. It can work with invisibles that are
strictly entailed by matter's behavior (the movements of iron filings that
require magnetic fields to account for them, e.g.), but not with others.
£. Our superiors, if such exist. This limitation does not prove that
beings greater than ourselves exist, but it does leave the question open,
for "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."
2. Ernest Gellner's alternative definition - postmodernism is "relativismus uber Alles," page 40 in his Post modernism, Reason and Religion (New York:
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Routledge, 1992) - converges with Lyotard's in the end, but relativism is not
an easy position to defend, so postmoderns do everything they can to avoid
that label; Clifford Geertz's "anti-antirelativism" is a case in point. The T-shirts
that blossomed on the final day of the 1987 NEH Institute in Berkeley tell the
story. Superimposed on a slashed circle, their logo read, "No Cheap
Relativism." By squirming, postmoderns can parry crude relativisms, but if
meaning is contextual and there is no metacontext, alternatives are ultimately
una judicable. Postmoderns resist that conclusion, however, so I shall not press
Gellner's definition of their position but stay with their own: Lyotard's.
3. Alan Wallace, Choosing Reality (Boston and Shaftsbury: Shambala,
1989).
4. No science textbook includes things that are greater than human
beings. Bigger, of course, and wielding more physical power; but not superior
in the full sense of that word which includes virtues, such as intelligence, compassion, and bliss.
5. David Harvey speaks for this mainline position when he writes:
"Postmodernists insist [that] we cannot aspire to any unified representation of
the world, or picture it as a totality rather than as perpetually shifting fragments" (The Condition of Postmodernity [Cambridge MA & Oxford UK:
Blackwell, 1990], p. 52).
6. Terry Eagleton, "Awakening from Modernity," Times Literary
Supplement, 20 February 1987.
7. To highlight the opposition between postmodernism and religion, I am
intentionally tabling in this statement the differences among religions that I
explore in Darrol Byrant (ed.), Huston Smith; Essays on World Religions (New
York: Paragon House, 1992).
8. In Richard Kearney, Dialogue with Contemporary Continental Thinkers
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 123-24.
9. One has to read quite a ways to learn that this doesn't mean what it
says. It means - per Rodolphe Gasche, The Tciin of the Mirror (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 281 - that "nothing outside the text can,
like a last reason, assume a fulfilling function"; which itself is not the plainest
way of saying that there is nothing outside a text that determines that it has
only one plausible meaning.
10. John Caputo, "Good News about Alterity: Derrida and Theology,"
Faith and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 453.
11. Walt Anderson, Reality Isn't What It Used to Be (San Francisco: Harper &
Row, 1990), p. 87.
12. Otherwise stated: "What I find so galling is the poststructuralists' conscious championing of style over substance" (Edward Slingerland, "Notes on
the Poststructuralist Code," The American Scholar, Autumn 1994, p. 632).
13. See Jacques Derrida, "A Number of Yes," translated by Brian Holmes,
Qui Parle 2 (1988), pp. 120-33.
14. In Richard Kearney, op. cit., p. 124.
15. "However negative negative theology intends to be, it is still making a
positive point." John Caputo, speaking for Derrida, in op. cit., p. 458.
16. John Caputo, ibid.
17. Caputo develops this connection. "Although Derrida is not a religious
writer, and does not, as far as I know, hold any religious views, his thought
seems to me in no small part driven by a kind of biblical sensitivity, let us say a
hyperbolic hypersensitivity, to the demands of the other, to the claims laid
upon us by the different one, of the one who is left out or cast out, who lacks a
voice or a hearing, a standing or stature" (ibid., p. 466).
18. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,"
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in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel
Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson [New York: Routledge, 1992], pp 14-15).
19. John Caputo, ibid., p. 454, 457.
20. In David Berreby's review of Randy Allen Harris, The Linguistics Wars
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), in The Sciences,
January/February, 1994, p.49.
21. There was a dramatic moment at the December, 1980, meeting of the
American Philosophical Association when Richard Rorty pressed his critics to
offer examples of cases "where some philosophical inquiry into the conceptual
foundations of X provided any furtherance of our understanding of X." Many
think that his challenge has not been met, and it seems to me time to put the
same challenge to deconstruction. Confining ourselves to this essay's concern,
is there a single passage in the Hebrew canon, say, whose religious message can
be deepened by deploying skills that Derrida possesses and rabbinic commentators through the ages lacked?
22. John Caputo, op. cit., p. 463.
23. Saul Bellow, It All Adds Up (New York: Viking, 1994), p. 97.
24. This exaltation of method over intuitive discernments is an academic
disease of our times. In the case at hand, "presences" are rendered suspect and
confidence shifted to the deconstructive method. But "if the optic nerve has to
be examined in order to be sure that vision is real, it will be necessary to examine that which examines the optic nerve, an absurdity which proves in its own
indirect way that knowledge of suprasensible things is intuitive and cannot be
other than intuitive" (Frithjof Schuon).
25. David Loy, "Avoiding the Void: The Lack of Self in Psychotherapy and
Buddhism," The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, Vol. 24, No.2 (1992), p. 153.
26. Rene Roques, Preface to Pseudo-Dionysius (New York: Paulist
Press,1987), pp. 7, 6). Emphasis added.
27. "The point of deconstruction is to loosen and unlock structures ... to
allow [things] to function more freely and ...open-endedly. It warns against letting [things] close over or shut down, for this would imprison something in
systems which struggles to twist free" (Caputo, op. cit., pp. 456-57). What - to
echo an earlier point - if it is racism that is trying to twist free from civil rights
legislation that struggles to contain it?
28. Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth: The Common Vision of the World's
Religions (HarperSanFrancisco, 1976/1992).
29. The breakup of colonialism following World War II got mixed up with
Marx's hermeneutic of suspicion in a curious and unfortunate way. Marx was
able to show quite convincingly that much of what capitalists took for truth
was actually ideology - a refection of their class interests - but his successors
slipped into assuming that because capitalists thought their truth was objective
and oppressed people, belief in objective truth must cause oppression. No
Descartes, no imperialism. This is ironic,for Marx mounted his hermeneutics
of suspicion to clear the ground for his view of things which he considered
objective. His stratagems, though, were powerful and took on a life of their
own. Eventually (with help from Nietzsche, Freud, and others) they turned
against their fathers by undermining confidence in objective truth generally.
Parenthetically but importantly: that knowledge, to the degree that it is
such, is objective; and that objectivity is not fully such if the context that
insures it is less than inclusive, are momentous points, but in this essay I must
simply assume their truth. There isn't space to defend them.
30. On survival, we have Clifford Geertz's report that "though it is not logically impossible for a people to have [no] metaphysics, we do not seem to have
found such a people" ("Ethos, World-View and the Analysis of Sacred
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Symbols," Antioch Review [1957], p. 338.)
31. Wittgenstein's definition of the mystical: the sense that we are completely safe.
32. This, of course, is precisely what postmodern anthropologists deny.
The discipline that began as the effort to learn about other peoples and cultures
now obsesses over the impossibility of that project. Currently, anthropologists
evince their seriousness by recognizing that "facts" about other peoples are
only superficially such. When the ever-shifting, culture-bound, contradictory,
and deserving-of-deconstruction meanings of the natives interface with the
anthropologists' equally slippery meanings, what hope is there that minds can
meet? Those who set out aspiring to understand, return to soliloquize on the
anguish of field experiences in which they and their subjects try to break out of
their respective cocoons, with failure built into the project from its start.
33. David Harvey, op. cit., p. 59.
34. I am indebted to Robert Scharlemann for pointing out the relevance of
this for my argument.
35. Truth is objective, and "the attack on objectivity is the most visible intellectual current of our age," (Paul Robinson, Freud and His Critics [Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993]).
36. Robert Kane's Through the Moral Maze: Searching for Absolute Values in
a Pluralistic World (New York: Paragon House, 1994) makes this point convincingly.
37. Richard Madsen, one of the authors of The Good Society, Robert Bellah et
al. (New York: Knopf, 1991) in an unpublished lecture.
38. San Francisco Chronicle, 1 October 1992, A16.
39. Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1936), p. 59. Ernst Cassirer corroborates Lovejoy on this
point: "The most important legacy of ancient speculation was the concept and
general picture of a graduated cosmos" (The Individual and the Cosmos in
Renaissance Philosophy [New York: Harper and Row, 1964]' p. 9).
40. Ken Wilber, "The Great Chain of Being," Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, Vol. 33, No.3 (Summer 1993), p. 53.

